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SUPREME COURT RAMIFICATIONS
CONFUSION SURROUNDING THE
GOOD FAITH DOUBT EVIDENTIARY
STANDARD GOES UNCHECKED:
NLRB v. CUR TIN MATHESON
SCIENTIFIC, INC.
The National Labor Relations Board' ("NLRB" or "the
Board") was established by the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA" or "the Act")' as the authority through which national
See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1988). The existence and powers of the National Labor Relations
Board were created by the National Labor Relations Act. Id. "'The Board performs two
distinct functions under the Act-the prevention and remedying of unfair labor practices,
and the determination of questions concerning employee representation." L MODJzsKA,
NLRB PRAcnca § 1.1, at 7 (1983). The Board has the responsibility of being both prosecu-
tor and judge of violations of the Act. A. Cox, D. BoK & R. Go AN, LAwot LAw 84 (10th
ed. 1986). The responsibility is manifested in the ability to issue complaints, prosecute the
offenders, and decide cases on their merits. Id.
Federal courts are authorized to review the Board's decisions as to issues of law. Id.
When faced with issues of fact, the courts are restricted to determining whether the
Board's findings are supported by "substantial evidence." Id. See Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1957) (Congress gave Board exclusive authority to ascertain
and prevent unfair labor practices).
I National Labor Relations [Wagner] Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)). The predecessor to the National
Labor Relations Act was the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1934 (NIRA). See D.
Twomgy. Lm3a LAw AND LGZIm.ATION § 17 (7th ed. 1985). Section 7(a) of that Act pro-
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labor policies are developed and enforced.3 The Board's rules and
policies are afforded great deference by the courts provided that
they are rational and consistent with the Act.' The primary pur-
vided, inter alia, that "'employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing." Id. The NIRA was ultimately declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it improperly delegated legislative power to the Presi-
dent in prescribing codes of fair competition. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935). Immediately after the Schechter decision, Congress enacted the
National Labor Relations Act, the purpose of which was to eliminate the barriers which
perpetuated labor's lack of bargaining power and had resulted in a number of detrimental
consequences, "namely, poor working conditions, depression of wage rates, and diminution
of purchasing power, all of which had served to cause and aggravate business depressions."
TwOMEY, supra, § 17, at 42-3.
The basis for the enactment of the NLRA was congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce. Id. "[Liabor practices may have so direct a relation to commerce as to come
within the ambit of Federal jurisdiction." S. REP,. No. 1184, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934),
reprinted in I NLRB, LrzisLATrVE HISTORY OF TmE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935,
at 11 12 (1949). Section one of the Act states that "protection by law of the right of em-
ployees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment,
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest .. " 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). The constitutionality
of the Act was immediately challenged. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 49 (1937). The challenge was dismissed and the Act's constitutionality upheld. See
id. at 41. The Court stated that "stoppage of [manufacturing] operations by industrial
strife would have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce," and is, therefore, within
the realm of congressional power. Id.
The NLRA led to the growth of labor unions and rapid spread of collective bargaining.
Cox, Bog & GORMAN, supra note 1, at 89. As a result of perceived abuses of power by. labor
organizations, Congress subsequently passed the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Id. Taft-Hartley
curbed the power of the unions by reviving legal intervention into labor disputes, recogniz-
ing the right to refrain from union activities, and extending governmental regulation of
collective bargaining. Id. at 89-93. Congress undertook similar changes again in 1959 when
it passed the Landrum-Griffin Act expanding on the restrictions of the earlier amendment.
Id. at 94.
5 See NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) (Buffalo Linen). The Supreme
Court has recognized that "[tihe function of striking [a] balance to effectuate national la-
bor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the' Congress committed
primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review." Id. See,
e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978). In Beth Israel, the Court
enforced the Board's ruling that hospital employees were allowed to distribute literature in
areas of the hospital that would not disrupt patient care. Id. The Court stated the following
in regard to the Board's responsibilities: "[Tlhe Board is expert in federal national labor
relations policy, and it is in the Board, not [the Hospital], that the 1974 amendments
vested responsibility for developing that policy in the health-care industry." Id.; NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963) (Court recognized Board's special function
of applying Act's provisions to complexities of industrial life).
' See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). The Board is "one of
those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized
field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an expertness
which courts do not possess and therefore must respect." Id. See also NLRB v. Iron Work-
ers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978) (considerable deference given Board rulings where they re-
present defensible construction of NLRA); NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-
NLRB v. Curtin Matheson
pose of the Act was to establish industrial peace and foster stabil-
ity in bargaining relationships5 through the exercise of employee
freedom of choice6 within a bargaining unit.7 Once a union has
66 (1978) (Board may depart from its earlier precedents as "evolutional approach is partic-
ularly fitting" for construction of NLRA); NLRB v. Bufco Corp.. 899 F.2d 608, 609 (7th
Cir. 1990) ("we extend the Board deference in fashioning national labor policy"). But see
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965). The courts have a responsibility to review
Board decisions "that they deem inconsistent with [the] statutory mandate or that frustrate
the Congressional policy underlying [the] statute." Id. See also Cox, Box & GORMAN, supra
note 1, at 110. The principles guiding judicial review of Board decisions are very general,
leaving the courts much discretion. Id. For example, in fiscal year 1982, 78.6% of the
Board's decisions were affirmed in the Tenth Circuit, while the First Circuit affirmed only
42.1% of the Board's decisions. Id.
The Board's findings of fact are conclusive unless they are not "supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole." See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988). The courts
have wider latitude when reviewing the Board's conclusions of law, but it is generally rec-
ognized that Board policies are subject only to limited review. K. MCGUNESS & J. NORRIS,
How To TARE A CASE BEFORE THE NLRB § 17.19, at 424 (5th ed. 1986). See, e.g., Charles D.
Bonanno Linen Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412-18 (1982). In deciding that a
bargaining impasse did not justify an employer's unilateral withdrawal from a multi-em-
ployer bargaining unit, the Court upheld the Board and noted that "the Board, employing
its expertise in the light of experience, has sought to balance the 'conflicting legitimate
interests' in pursuit of the 'national policy of promoting labor peace through strengthened
collective bargaining.'" Id. at 413 (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 96
(1957) (Buffalo Linen)).
* See 29 U.S.C. § 1511 (1988). Section 1 sets forth this objective as follows:
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id.
In enacting the NLRA, Congress sought "to remove certain important sources of indus-
trial unrest engendered, first, by the denial of the right of employees to organize and by
the refusal of employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining .... " H.R. REP.
No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 6 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIvE HIS'roRY OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 2915 (1949). "Such unrest . . . leads to
strikes and other forms of economic pressure which obstruct and burden the free flow of
interstate and foreign commerce." Id. at 2915-16.
* 29 U.S.C. § 1577 (1988). Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all such activities ....
Id.
' See Cox, BOK & GORMAN, supra note 1, at 282-83. In determining bargaining units, the
Board seeks to group employees who are united by a "community of interest." Id. at 282.
The factors the Board uses to determine if there is a "community of interest" among em-
ployees are: similar earnings and earnings determination; similar employment benefits,
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majority support within a bargaining unit, an employer is obli-
gated to recognize the union and negotiate with it in good faith.8
To promote stability in bargaining relationships, the Board has
adopted the presumption of continuing majority support' for an
incumbent union.10 An employer may rebut this presumption, and
lawfully withdraw recognition of the union," if it has a "good
working hours and other terms of employment; similar type of work performed; similar job
skills and qualifications; similar geographic proximity; frequency of interemployee commu-
nication; continuity of the production process; common supervision; history of collective
bargaining; desires of employees; and extent of union organization. Id. at 283. See also
NLRB v. Purnell's Pride Inc., 609 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980). The "community of interest"
analysis has been developed by the Board and the courts to guide the Board in choosing
"viable bargaining units .... ." Id. at 1156. In order to determine whether a group is
bound by a " 'community of interest,' the Board and the courts have looked to 'such fac-
tors as bargaining history, operational integration, geographic proximity, common supervi-
sion, similarity in job function, and degree of employee interchange.' " Id.
s See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a), 159(a) (1988). The duty of an employer to bargain with
the union representative chosen by its employees is set forth in Sections 7-9 of the NLRA.
See 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1988). See generally Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
678, 683-84 (1944) (under Section 9(a) chosen representatives of majority of unit employ-
ees are exclusive representatives for purposes of collective bargaining); Whisper Soft Mills,
Inc. v. NLRB, 754 F.2d 1381, 1385 (1984) ("The duty of an employer to bargain with the
chosen representatives of his employees... is an obligation only to the certified bargaining
representative.") (citing 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1978)).
9 See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98 (1954). During the first year of certification, the
union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority support. Id. In Brooks, the Supreme
Court found that the certification year rule, as applied by the Board, was rational and
consistent with the Act. Id. at 103-04. It supported the policy of industrial peace by not
allowing an employer to move slowly in recognition of the union and thereby allowing the
union's majority to fade. Id. at 100. This rule forces employers to bargain in good faith
with the union and hence promote industrial peace. Id.
In the years following the certification year, the union enjoys a rebuttable presumption
of majority support. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 n.3 (1972)
(citing Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672 (1951)). See also Mingtree Restau-
rant, Inc. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1295, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1984) (presumption rebuttable one
year after certification); NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1978)
(same), cert denited, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
10 See Brooks, 348 U.S. at 98. See also NLRB v. San Clemente Publishing, 408 F.2d 367,
369 (9th Cir. 1969) (Brooks rule applies to unions chosen by means other than Board-con-
ducted election).
An incumbent union is one that has been recognized by an employer as the exclusive
bargaining representative of its employees. See Comment, Employer Reftisal to Bargain with
an Incumbent Striking Union: Determining Liability Under Section 8(aX5), 18 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
731, 731 n.2 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Determining Liability]. A union becomes the
bargaining agent either as the result of an election or other formal NLRB certification
proceeding or through informal recognition. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988). "Rep-
resentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority
of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representa-
tives of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining .... " Id.
" See Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1109-10 (1st Cir. 1981). To
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faith doubt" of the union's majority status."' Determining the law-
fulness of an employer's withdrawal of recognition becomes com-
plex, however, when the withdrawal is justified by the fact that
the employer has hired striker replacements1 4 for its employees
overcome the union's majority support presumption an employer has the burden of dem-
onstrating either 1) that the union in fact no longer has the majority; or 2) "a reasonable,
good faith doubt of the union's majority." Id. (citing National Rental Car Sys., Inc. v.
NLRB, 594 F.2d 1203, 1205 (8th Cir. 1979)). See also Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB,
519 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1975) (evidence of dissatisfaction with union activities insuffi-
cient to raise reasonable doubt of majority support), enforcing 19 N.L.R.B. 290 (197 1); Ter-
rell Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir. 1970), enfg, 173 N.L.R.B. 1480
(1969).
Even during the certification year, an employer can lawfully withdraw recognition of the
union when there are "unusual circumstances". See Seger, The Majority Status of Incumbent
Bargaining Representatives, 47 TUL L. RLrV. 961, 966-78 (1973). The Board has defined "un-
usual circumstances" as 1) when the union has become defunct, 2) when a schism has devel-
oped within the union, and 3) when there has been a rapid fluctuation in the size of the
bargaining unit. Id. See also NLRB v. Lee Office Equip., 572 F.2d 704, 706 (9th Cir. 1978)
(during certification year union lost all employee support); Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 69
N.L.R.B. 935, 938-39 (1946) (overwhelming majority of employees transferred to new lo-
cal union during certification year); Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 325, 326
(1944) (during certification year, employees unanimously voted to dissolve union); Westing-
house Elec. & Mfg. Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 404, 409 (1942) (radical change in bargaining unit
size during certification year).
1, See Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1340 (1981) (presumption of ma-
jority status may be rebutted by evidence of good faith doubt), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th
Cir. 1989). See also Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672-73 (1951). In Celanese,
the Board identified two essential considerations in a review of the employer's good faith
doubt: (1) the employer must have a reasonable basis in fact for doubting the union's ma-jority status; (2) the issue cannot arise from the employer's illegal antiunion activity aimed
at undermining union majority support. Id.
1s Flynn, The Economic Strike Bar: Looking Beyond the "Union Sentiments" of Permanent
Repitcements, 61 TEmp. L. Rxv. 691, 694 (1988). The complexity is a result of the fact that
both strikers and permanent striker replacements are considered employees under Section
2(3) of the Act. Id. Employee is defined as including "any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained regular and substantially equivalent em-
ployment .... " 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). Therefore, both strikers and permanent re-
placement strikers can vote in a union election and both strikers and permanent replace-
ment strikers are part of the bargaining unit. Flynn, supra. at 694.
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Mackay, 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938). In Mackay, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Board's decision that an employer is not guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tice if it hires replacements for striking employees in order to maintain operations and
carry on its business. Id. In addition, the employer is not obligated to discharge replace-
ments once the strike is over. Id. This is true as long as the strike is an economic strike. See
R. GORMAN, LABOR LAw. UNIONIZATION AND COLLErE BARGAINING 341 (1976). Employers
are not allowed to hire permanent replacement workers during an unfair labor practice
strike. Brown Shoe Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 803, 834 (1936). See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B.
1366, 1369-70 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970). After the strike has terminated, the employer is required to reinstate economic
strikers who have not obtained equivalent employment once vacancies arise, and absent any
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 6: 93, 1990
when the union has commenced an economic strike."
Historically, the Board has taken several different positions in
attempting to determine striker replacement support for the
union." Initially, it adopted a presumption that striker replace-
ments opposed the union ("replacement anti-union presump-
legitimate business reasons. Id. at 1369.
Recently, there has been a push in Congress to pass a bill which would prohibit an em-
ployer from hiring permanent replacement workers during the first 10 weeks of a strike.
See Unions Back Brennan Bill to Prohibit Immediate Hiring of Striker Replacements, DAILY LAs.
Rp'r. (BNA) No. 54, at A-I 1 (March 22, 1989) (bill proposed by Rep. Joseph Brennan (D-
Maine) as amendment to NLRA). Rep. Brennan stated that the impetus for the bill was the
1988 strike by the United Paperworkers International Union against the International Pa-
per Corp. (IP). Id. In one of the affected IP plants, replacement workers were hired 13
days into the strike, and eventually more than 1,000 replacement workers were hired. Id.
A disheartened Rep. Brennan declared that "[w]orkers who spent ten, twenty, thirty years
of their lives at IP. . .were thrown out like yesterday's newspapers." Id. Rehiring of the
striking workers eventually became the main issue in the prolonged strike, which was offi-
cially called off by the union in October 1988. Id. The union asserted that very few strikers
had been rehired, "[i]n effect," said Brennan, "these workers were fired for exercising
their rights to strike." Id. The bargaining strategy of employers hiring striker replacements
immediately after commencement of a strike became a prevalent practice after President
Reagan fired striking air traffic controllers in 1981. Id.
More recently, however, in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 920 F.2d
722, 727-29 (11 th Cir. 1990), the airline was required to reinstate returning pilots prior to
giving permanent pilot positions to newly hired pilots still in training, holding that trainees
are not employees. But see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight At-
tendents, 109 S. Ct. 1225 (1989). The Supreme Court held that the airline would not be
required to displace junior crossovers from the strike in order to reinstate more senior full-
term strikers. Id. at 1230. The Court reasoned that to distinguish crossovers from new
hires would penalize nonstrikers in order to benefit strikers. Id. at 1233.
1' See Crossroads Chevrolet, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 728, 729 n.4 (1977) (strike to achieve
objective such as higher wages, shorter hours, or recognition by means of economic pres-
sure). See also GoRMAN, supra note 14, at 339. Economic strikes involve union demands
concerning union recognition, wages, hours and/or working conditions. Id. If a strike oc-
curs shortly after an employer's unfair labor practice, it is referred to as an unfair labor
practice strike. Id. An economic strike can be converted into an unfair labor practice strike
if an employer commits an unfair labor practice that in turn extends the length of the
strike. Id. In theory, the employee is an economic striker during the period the economic
strike would have proceeded on its own. Id. Thereafter, for the period the strike is pro-
longed, the employee is considered an unfair labor practice striker. Id.
" NLRB v. Buckley Broadcasting Corp. of Cal., 891 F.2d 230, 232-33 (9th Cir. 1989),
enforcing, Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
2619 (1990). In the past, the Board has used three different approaches to determine the
union sentiments of striker replacements. Id. at 232. Until 1975, the Board consistently
held that striker replacements oppose the incumbent union. Buckley, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1340.
In 1975, Board dictum suggested that striker replacements support the union in the same
ratio as those employees they have replaced. Id. at 1341 (citing Cutten Supermarket, 220
N.L.R.B. 507, 509 (1975)). In Buckley, the Board rejected both the aforementioned pre-
sumptions and decided that they would not presume anything with regard to the union
sentiments of striker replacements and would render decisions on a case-by-case basis. See
Buckley, 891 F.2d at 233.
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tion") 7 It later presumed that striker replacements supported the
union in the same ratio as the employees they replaced ("replace-
ment pro-union presumption").'0 After meeting resistance to both
presumptions at the circuit level, " the Board changed its position
once again and announced it would follow a no-presumption ap-
proach when determining the union sentiments of striker replace-
ments.' 0 This most recent position was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.."
In 1970, Teamsters Local 968, was certified by the Board as
collective bargaining agent for Curtin Matheson's production and
maintenance employees." After twenty-four days of unsuccessful
negotiations aimed at reaching a new collective bargaining agree-
ment," the union commenced an economic strike on June 12,
1979." Immediately, five union employees crossed the picket line
and reported for work," and soon thereafter twenty-nine perma-
nent replacement employees were hired." The union ended its
strike on July 16 by offering to accept Curtin Matheson's final of-
fer made prior to the commencement of the strike but were in-
See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
* See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
See Whisper Soft Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 754 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984) (enforce-
ment denied as court noted opposition to presumption by other circuits); NLRB v. Pennco,
Inc., 684 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir.) (enforced Board order although Court rejected both
replacement presumptions), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 994 (1982); Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v.
NLRB. 652 F.2d 1055, 1111 (1st Cir. 1981) (enforcement denied in relevant part as court
found replacements are presumed not to support union whose picket line they cross); Na-
tional Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 594 F.2d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1979) (enforcement
denied as court found pro-union presumption inapplicable where turnover results from
hiring permanent striker replacements); NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc.,
584 F.2d 720, 729 (5th Cir. 1978) (enforced Board order although court noted rejection.of
pro-union presumption).
" See Buc", 284 N.L.R.B. at 1344-45 (adopting case-by-case review requiring evidence
of nonunion support before presumption of continued majority support is rebutted), en-
forced, 891 F.2d 230, 233 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990).
" 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990).
Id. at 1547.
"Id. Negotiations began after the May 21, 1979 expiration of the parties' collective
bargaining agreement. Id. Following the Union's rejection of the employer's final offer on
May 25, a lockout was instituted. Id. Eight days later, the offer was renewed. Id. However,
the union again rejected the offer. Id.
" Id.
" Id. There were 27 bargaining unit employees, 22 of whom took part in the strike. Id.
" NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1547 (1990). The 29 per-
manent replacements were hired to replace the 22 employees on strike. Id.
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formed that the offer had been withdrawn.' Subsequently, Curtin
Matheson refused to recognize or bargain with the Union any fur-
ther stating that it doubted the Union's majority support."8
On July 30, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with
the NLRB alleging that the employer's withdrawal of recognition,
refusal to execute a contract embodying the terms of the em-
ployer's final offer prior to the strike, and failure to provide re-
quested information violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA.' Following an investigation, the Board issued a com-
plaint." In defense, Curtin Matheson maintained that its good
faith doubt was based on the hiring of striker replacements, anti-
union statements made by replacements, cross-overs, and strikers,
as well as statements made by union representatives regarding the
weakness of the union and poor employee support.8 1 The Admin-
istrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the complaint, finding that no
unfair labor practices had occurred."" On review, the Board re-
versed the ALJ's ruling and, applying the no-presumption policy,
found that Curtin Matheson had not presented sufficient evidence
to establish that the replacements opposed the union. The
27 Id. at 1547.
U8 Id. On the date of the withdrawal of recognition from the Union, the bargaining unit
consisted of 25 striker replacements, the 5 employees who crossed the picket line and ap-
proximately 20 former strikers who had applied for reinstatement upon termination of the
strike. Id.
" Id. On the day the strike was terminated the union requested that Curtin Matheson
supply it with information regarding the number of employees in the bargaining unit, the
job classifications and seniority of each employee. Id. On July 20, Curtin Matheson refused
to respond to this request because it had withdrawn recognition of the union. Id.
80 NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1547 (1990).
s1 Id. at 1547-48. The anti-union sentiments expressed by the employees included: a
single replacement employee asserting that the union did not represent the company and
was not needed; two cross-over employees (not union members) indicating the union had
done nothing for the employees; four strikers, including the shop steward, stating that the
union, not the employees, wanted the strike, that employees wouldn't man the picket line,
were not supporting the union and wanted the strike to end. Id.
Curtin Matheson relied on the rationale of NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv.
Inc., 584 F.2d 720, 728 (5th Cir. 1978), in making its good faith doubt contentions. In
Randle-Eastern, the court announced its adoption of the so-called "Gorman presumption,"
namely that "if a new hire agrees to serve as a replacement for a striker ... it is generally
assumed that he does not support the union and that he ought not be counted toward a
Union majority" Id. (citing R. GoasiAN, LABOR LAW. UNIONIZTION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 112 (1976)).
U Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 350, 350 (1987), enforcement denied,
859 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990).
" Id. The Board cited with approval its decision in Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284
100
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Board found that Curtin Matheson was unable to prove a good
faith doubt of union majority support because it lacked a sufficient
objective basis on which to sustain such doubt." Therefore, Cur-
tin Matheson violated the Act when it withdrew recognition from
the union." The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit refused to enforce the Board's order and held that the Board
must presume striker replacements oppose the union and that Cur-
tin Matheson was justified in its doubt of union majority sup-
port." The court maintained that the effect of the no-presump-
tion approach was the same as the pro-union presumption which it
had previously rejected in NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Ser-
vice, Inc.37 Additionally, it should be noted that the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Curtin Matheson was in accord with holdings in the First
and Eighth Circuits." Other circuit courts, while not flatly re-
jecting the replacement pro-union presumption, had expressed
disapproval .9
N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), which adopted the no-presumption approach to determine the
union sentiments of striker replacements. Id. See also NLRB v. Pennco, 684 F.2d 340, 342
(6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 994 (1982).
" See Curtin Matheson, 287 N.L.R.B. at 352-53.
I d. at 353 (concluding that evidence insufficient to rebut presumption of union's con-
tinuing majority status). See also Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1345
(1987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989) (insufficient evidence to support withdrawal
of recognition).
" NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 859 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1988) (dis-
agreeing that Buckley Broadcasting (Station KKHI) established no-presumption standard).
See also NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1549 n.7.
7 See Curtin Matheson, 859 F.2d at 367. Under either the replacement pro-union pre-
sumption or the neutral position, the employer carries the burden of producing objective
evidence that the replacements do not support the union in order to overcome the pre-
sumption of continuing majority support. Id. See also NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance
Serv., Inc., 584 F.2d 720, 728 (Court rejected Board's application of pro-union presump-
tion in an economic strike situation).
" See Curtin Matheson, 859 F.2d at 367. See also National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. NLRB,
594 F.2d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1979) (8th Circuit adopted striker replacement anti-union
presumption, i.e., "Gorman presumption"); Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d
1055, 1110-11 (1st Cir. 1981) (replacements are not presumed to support union and when
striker replacements constitute majority of unit, presumption of union support is under-
mined) (citing Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 NLRB 196 (1962)). But cf. infra notes 70 and 71
(cases cited advocating pro-union presumption).
" See NLRB v. Wilder Constr. Co., 804 F.2d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 1986) (explicit evi-
dence of union rejection and repudiation necessary to rebut presumption of continuing
majority support); NLRB v. Pennco, Inc., 684 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1982) (court de-
clined to recognize presumption that new hires, i.e., replacements, either supported or op-
posed the union, holding that objective evidence governs), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 994
(1984); NLRB v. Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 577 F.2d 805, 813 (2d Cir. 1978)
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In an attempt to resolve the split among the circuits, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari"0 and in a 5-4 decision reversed
the Fifth Circuit's holding.' The Court held that the Board did
not have to presume that the striker replacements opposed the
union."' Further, the Board's no-presumption approach to assess-
ing the union sentiments of striker replacements was found to be
rational and consistent with the NLRA."
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated that the specific
issue before the court was "whether, in assessing whether a partic-
ular employer possessed a good faith doubt, the Board must adopt
a general presumption of replacement opposition to the union.""
The majority reasoned that the circumstances involved in each
strike situation varied dramatically; consequently, the Board's no-
presumption approach was rational." The Court held the Board's
new policy approach was not only consistent with previous deci-
sions, but was also consistent with the NLRA's overall policy of
promoting industrial peace. 46 The Court further explained that its
duty in administrative cases was merely to review the Board's re-
fusal to adopt an anti-union presumption and to express its opin-
ion on whether the no-presumption approach was rational and
consistent with the NLRA.17 Where the Board's actions have re-
(court rejected pro-union presumption but also expressed disapproval of the anti-union
presumption).
'o NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 3212 (1989).
" NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990).
4" Id. at 1554.
49 Id.
" Id. at 1545 n.2.
"Id. at 1552. Striker replacements might not recognize a strike due to financial reasons
or they might not agree with the purpose of a particular strike, while still wanting that
union's representation at the bargaining table. Id. at 1550.
" NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1553 (1990). The no-
presumption policy is rational and consistent with the NLRA because it furthers the overall
policy of "industrial peace." Id. The no-presumption rule limits an employer's ability to
oust a union without significant evidence of lack of majority support. Id. See also Fall River
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 40 (1987). Since this presumption does
not allow an employer to easily oust a union it gives employees freedom to engage in con-
certed activities. Id.
"1 See Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1545 n.2 (1990). The Majority countered Justice
Scalia's assertion that the issue before the Court was whether "substantial evidence" sup-
ported the Board's factual finding that good faith doubt was not established based on the
evidence, by proclaiming that the "substantial evidence" standard was inapplicable to the
question at hand. Id. The issue, the majority declared, was simply to determine whether
the Board's refusal to adopt the presumption was rational and consistent with the Act. Id.
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mained rational and consistent with the Act, 8 the Court has ac-
corded great deference4 to its decisions, even when it has de-
parted from previous positions.5
In dissent," Justice Scalia argued that the issue before the
Court was not whether the Board can take a no-presumption ap-
proach, but whether there was in fact substantial evidence to sup-
port the Board's findings in this case.5' Justice Scalia found that
(citing NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 787 (1979)).
The Court in Curtin Matheson also stated that it was for the Court of Appeals, on re-
mand, to consider, without applying any replacement presumptions, whether the evidence
supported a finding that the respondent failed to present an objectively reasonable doubt
of the union's majority status. Curtin Matheson, 1 10 S. Ct. at 1545 n.2.
s Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1549. See also Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483,
501 (1978). "The judicial role is narrow: the rule which the Board adopts is judicially re-
viewable for consistency with the Act, and for rationality, but if it satisfies those criteria,
the Board's application of the rule, if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole, must be enforced." Id.
4' Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1549. See also NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251,
266 (1976) (Board's special competence in industrial field is justification for the deference
accorded its determinations).
" Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1554. See also Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v.
NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 413 (1982) (Though Court may have struck a different balance re-
viewing de novo, it noted that assessing dynamics of collective bargaining is within Board's
authority); NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1957) (judgment of Court not to
be substituted for that of Board with respect to issues that Congress intended Board to
resolve).
"1 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1557 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices O'Connor and Ken-
nedy joined in dissent with justice Scalia. Id. justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissenting
opinion. Id. at 1555. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). justice Blackmun stated that the Board
cannot simply create a new policy without a supporting rationale. Id. at 1556. "The review-
ing court also must ask whether the agency's decision is the product of an adequate delib-
erative process and is consistent with other agency pronouncements . . . ." Id. at 1556
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). This dissent asserts that the new no-presumption policy cannot
be reconciled with previous Board decisions. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Leveld
Wholesale, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1350 (1978) (Striker replacements can reasonably
foresee that if union is successful strikers will return to work and striker replacements will
be out of job); Service Elec., 281 N.L.R.B. 633, 641 (1968) (because strikers want to return
to work and striker replacements want to remain working inherent conflict exists between
the two groups).
" Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1557 (Scalia, J., dissenting). justice Scalia asserted that
the issue confronting the Court was whether the Board's factual findings were supported
by substantial evidence. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). justice Scalia averred that it was a mis-
take for the Board to treat presumptions created by law, and inferences or presumptions of
fact as equivalent. Id. at 1563-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that the Board
may create and use presumptions of law, such as the presumption of continuing majority
support during the first year of a union's certification. Id. at 1564. But, the Board may not,
as it has done in Curtin Matheson, create presumptions of fact. Id. The Board may only use
reasonable and logical inferences drawn from the facts of a particular situation. Id. When-
ever a Board decision is reversed for lack of "substantial evidence" it is because the Board
ignored logical inferences that must be reasonably drawn. Id.
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there was substantial evidence to support Curtin Matheson's good
faith doubt of union majority.53 In addition, Justice Scalia asserted
that the majority's decision allowed the Board to make policy in
the guise of fact-finding and thus evade proper scrutiny." Finally,
writing separately in dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed concern
over the Board's lack of empirical evidence to support its no-pre-
sumption policy.55
In view of the responsibility placed on the Board and the con-
siderable deference the court has historically granted Board rules,
it is submitted that the decision to affirm the no-presumption ap-
proach in Curtin Matheson was correct. Nevertheless, the concerns
voiced in the concurring and dissenting opinions were not wholly
without merit. The Court should have admonished the Board for
the apparent inconsistencies and limitations in its present no-pre-
sumption policy with regard to the way in which an employer may
establish a good faith doubt of the union's majority support. This
comment will first analyze the history preceding the no-presump-
is Id. at 1560 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia reasoned that unions almost always
demand that striker replacements be fired. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Striker replacements
know this, Justice Scalia said, and consequently have interests which are in direct opposi-
tion to those of the strikers. See id. at 1560-61. Furthermore, Justice Scalia declared that
"there was not a shred of affirmative evidence that any striker replacement supported, or
had reason to support the union." Id. at 1560.
" Id. at 1565 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
It is one thing to say, 'The facts do not support conclusion X, and we decline to
impose conclusion X as a matter of law, since that would have adverse policy conse-
quences.' It is quite another thing to say, 'Even though the facts require conclusion
X, we reject it for policy reasons.' The former is what the Board has said here, and
the latter is what it would have to say to support its decision properly on policy
grounds.
Id. (Scalia, J.. dissenting).
See id. at 1556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Blackmun opined that
the Board's order should be invalidated because it had "departed, without explanation,
from principles announced and reaffirmed in its prior decisions" and that it had "made no
effort to explain the apparent inconsistency" between the present decision and those in
Service Electric, 281 N.L.R.B. 635 (1986), and Leved Wholesale, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1344
(1975). Id. at 1556. See also Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), crt denied, 403 U.S. 973 (1971).
An agency's view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or without
a change in circumstances. But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned
analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed,
not casually ignored, and if an agency glosses over or swerves from prior precedents
without discussion it may cross the line from the tolerably terse to the intolerably
mute.
Id. at 852 (footnotes omitted).
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tion policy. Then it will analyze the appropriateness of the no-
presumption policy as a sound compromise between the logic un-
derlying the replacement anti-union presumption and its further-
ance of the Act's policies as embodied in the pro-union presump-
tion. This comment will then discuss the Supreme Court's
decision in Curtin Matheson. It will assess the impact of the Court's
failure to require the Board to enunciate specific evidentiary stan-
dards upon which an employer may rely when asserting a good
faith doubt of union majority status. This comment will then dis-
cuss developments in this area which have occurred subsequent to
Curtin Matheson. Finally, this comment will suggest evidentiary
standards the Board should adopt in an attempt to alleviate the
remaining confusion surrounding the no-presumption policy.
I. PRE-CURTIN MATHESON: HISTORY PRECEDING NO-PRESUMPTION
POLICY
The Board has consistently upheld a long standing policy pre-
sumption that employees hired in a non-strike situation support
the union in the same ratio as those they replace." Until 1975,
the Board had refused to impose this policy in economic strike
situations.57 Its policy in strike situations had been that striker
" See Ray McDermott & Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 850, 859 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 893 (1978) (advocated presumption of majority support); NLRB v. A.W. Thomp-
son, Inc., 525 F.2d 870, 871-72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976) (refusal to
bargain may not be based on combination of employee turnover and anti-union com-
plaints); NLRB v. Washington Manor, Inc., 519 F.2d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 1975) (lack of
objective evidence that new employees do not support union is not considered evidence of
loss of majority status); Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1141 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974) (high turnover of employees is not evidence of loss
of majority support); Laystrum Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482, 1488-89 (1965) (presumption
of continuing majority support is valid absent preponderance of evidence to rebut it); Se-
ger, The Majority Status of Incumbent Bargaining Representatives, 47 TUL L. REv. 961, 990
(1973) (employee turnover standing alone is no ground for good faith doubt); Note, The
Striker's Replacement Presumption and an Employer's Duty to Bargain With the Incumbent Union,
21 B.C.L. Rv 455, 456 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Striker's Replacement Presumption] ("New
employees... are presumed to support the union in the same ratio as the employees whom
they replace.").
' See Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1444-45 (1959). The Board stated that an
employer cannot possibly prove that the union no longer has majority support as it does
not have access to membership lists and cannot directly interrogate employees. Id. It is
sufficient for the employer to produce evidence which will "cast a serious doubt" on the
union's majority status. Id. Therefore it was not unreasonable for the employer to assume
that none of the striker replacements supported the union. Id. at 1445-46. S & M Mfg. Co.,
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replacements oppose the union.58 For example, in S & M Manufac-
turing Co.,s" the Board found that the employer had lawfully with-
drawn recognition from the union on the basis that the striker
replacements, constituting a majority, opposed the union." Thus,
it was presumed that the union no longer enjoyed majority sup-
port." While the replacement anti-union presumption was a logi-
cal position,' the effect of this presumption was adverse to the
172 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1008-09 (1968) (among striker replacements it could not be found that
there were any union adherents); See also Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 196, 215
(1962) (ALJ found no evidence that replacements oppose union); Cf. Note, Striker's Replace-
ment Presumption, supra note 56, at 455 (striker replacement presumption should be aban-
doned or severely restricted).
" See R. GoRmAN, supra note 14, at 112-13. The Board stated,
[Il]f a new hire agrees to serve as a replacement for a striker . . . it is generally
assumed that he does not support the Union and that he ought not be counted to-
ward a Union majority. When such strikebreakers or permanent replacements con-
stitute a majority of the unit, the presumption of union support is undermined.
Id.
- 172 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1968).
Id. at 1008. On the date the employer withdrew recognition of the union the only
employees were former strikers that had resigned from the union and striker replacements.
Id. See also Jackson Mfg. Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 460, 461 (1960) ("it is doubtful that the union
represented anything near a majority of the employees, unless it could be shown (it was
not) that the replacements hired during the strike had chosen the Union to represent it-a
most improbable situation."); Peoples Gas Sys., Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 944 (1974), enforcement
denied, 532 F.2d 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (employer based its reasonable good faith doubt
partly on the fact that 40% of the employees were replaced during an economic strike) The
Board in People Gas, stated that "It was not unreasonable for respondent to infer that the
degree of union support among these employees who had chosen to ignore a union-spon-
sored picket line might well be somewhat weaker than the support offered by those who
had vigorously engaged in concerted activity on behalf on [sic] union-sponsored objec-
tives." Id. at 947.
s' See S & M Mfg. Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1008-09 (1968).
' See Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990).
[Ulnions and strikers have sometimes shown hostility toward the permanent replace-
ments, and in some instances, the Union has lacked interest, at least ... in negotiat-
ing on the replacements' behalf .... Permanent replacements are typically aware of
the union's primary concern for the striker's welfare rather than that of the replace-
ments. In this regard, the replacements' attitude towards union representation may
be influenced by this awareness ....
Id. at 1344; see, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 496 (1983) (union obtains dis-
charge of replacements); NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc., 584 F.2d 720,
724 (5th Cir. 1978) (union demands priority of strikers over replacements); IT Servs., 263
N.L.R.B. 1183, 1185 (1982) (union demanded that replacements be terminated; great deal
of violence directed against replacements). See also Flynn, The Economic Strike Bar: Looking
Beyond the "Union Sentiments" of Permanent Replacements, 61 TgMP. L. REv. 691, 708 (1988)
("replacement with any nose for survival.... will surely not support the union"); Weiler,
Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98
HAnv. L. Rav. 351, 390 (1984) (union will insist on bumping replacements as condition of
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policies of the Act. The replacement anti-union presumption dis-
couraged strikes,63 weakened bargaining stability," and provided
a sanctioned means of ousting a union simply by hiring a sufficient
number of striker replacements. 5
In 1975, the Board suggested in Cutten Supermarket" that
striker replacements could cross a picket line and support the
union in the same ratio as those they replace. 7 The Board offered
no support for this position." Windham Community Hospital" was
the first case to apply this replacement pro-union presumption
propounded in Cutten Supermarket.70 This presumption prevented
union ousting, protected the right to strike and promoted indus-
any settlement).
" See also Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1344 (1987) (risk of replace-
ment and loss of union due to unfair presumption impairs employees' right to strike), en-
forced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989); Weiler, supra note 62, at 390 (employer, by hiring
replacements, can fend off union pressure resulting in settlement unfavorable to strikers);
see generally NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (permanently
replaced strikers do not have right to reinstatement unless vacancies arise).
" See Pennco, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716, 717 (1980) (industrial stability promoted by pre-
sumption of continuing majority status), enforced on other grounds, 684 F.2d 340 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 994 (1982), overruled by Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B.
1339 (1987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990);
Flynn, supra note 62, at 705 (discussing undesirable consequences of antiunion pre-
sumption).
" See Weiler, supra note 62, at 390 (employer who hires enough permanent replace-
ments for strikers can eliminate union through NLRB-sponsored election); Schatzki, Some
Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer - "Protected" Concerted ActivitieS, 47 TEx.
L. REV. 378, 383 (1969) (MacKay is invitation to employer to rid itself of union); see generally
NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (economic strikers have
no legal standing to "bump" striker replacements).
a Cutten Supermarket, 220 N.L.R.B. 507 (1975) (dictum).
Id. at 509.
Id.
230 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1977), enforced, 577 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1978).
o See id. at 1070. In Windham, the Board held that new employees, including striker
replacements, were presumed to support the union in the same ratio as those they replace.
Id. But see Beacon Upholstery Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1360 (1976); Arkay Packaging Corp., 227
N.L.R.B. 397 (1976). In both Beacon Upholstery and Arkay the Board held that under some
circumstances the employer could not presume that the replacements supported the union.
Beacon Upholstery, 226 N.L.R.B. at 1368; Arkay, 227 N.L.R.B. at 397-98. In Beacon Uphol-
stery, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the employees had lawfully been ter-
minated. Beacon Upholstery, 226 N.L.R.B. at 1368. Therefore, the interests of the striker
replacements and the strikers were diametrically opposed. Id. In Arkay, the Board found
that a reasonable doubt existed as to the majority status of each union. Arkay, 227 N.L.R.B.
at 397. Therefore the employer could reasonably presume the replacements opposed the
union. Id. In later decisions, the Board viewed Arkay as a "limited exception" to the re-
placement pro-union presumption due to its unique circumstances. See Windham Commu-
nity Memorial Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1977), enforced, 577 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1978).
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trial stability by inducing settlements and fostering constancy in
the bargaining between the employer and the union throughout a
strike.7' However, the underpinnings of this presumption are pa-
tently irrational, based neither on logic nor fact.' The circuit
courts uniformly criticized this replacement pro-union presump-
tion,7s even while enforcing Board orders in particular cases.
7 4
II. INTRODUCTION OF THE No-PREsuMPTION POLICY
In 1987, the Board changed its striker replacement policy once
again. The Board, in Buckley Broadcasting Corp.75 abandoned the
presumptive approach entirely, stating that it could not make pol-
icy presuming the union sentiments of striker replacements.7 Al-
," See Flynn, supra note 62, at 707. The pro-union presumption prevented the employer
from provoking a strike and then hiring replacements as a means of ousting the union. Id.
Further, knowledge of this presumption created more confidence in the employees that a
strike would not jeopardize their representation and the possibility of returning to their
jobs. Id.
" See Weiler, supra note 62, at 390 (replacements are likely to be hostile to union, if
only because union will insist on their discharge as condition of settlement). See also Flynn,
supra note 62, at 708 (presumption that replacements support union is irrational); National
Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 594 F.2d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1979) ("wholly unwarranted
and unrealistic" to presume replacement support for union).
With respect to the irrationality of the pro-union presumption, the Court has ruled that
the Board may not adopt presumptions which are irrational. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp.,
Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 787 (1979) (presumption adopted and applied by Board must rest on
sound factual connection between proved and inferred facts); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB,
437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978) (Board rules are reviewable for rationality).
' See, e.g., National Rental Car Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 594 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1979). The
court stated, "[t]he presumption . .. is not specifically authorized by statute and is so far
from reality in this particular case that it does not deserve further comment .... " Id. at
1206. See also Whisper Soft Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 754 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984)
(presumption that strike replacements support Union in same ratio as strikers never em-
braced by any circuit court); Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir.
1981); NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc., 584 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1978).
' Vulcan Hart Corp. v. NLRB, 718 F.2d 269, 275 (8th Cir. 1983) (enforced on grounds
other than pro-union presumption which was criticized); NLRB v. Pennco, Inc., 684 F.2d
340, 342 (6th Cir.) (same), cet. denied, 459 U.S. 994 (1982), overruled by Buckley Broadcast-
ing Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989), tert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990); Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1110 (1st Cir.
1981) (same); NLRB v. Randle-Eastern Ambulance Services, Inc., 584 F.2d 720, 728 (5th
Cir. 1978) (same); NLRB v. Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 577 F.2d 805, 812 (2d
Cir. 1978) (same).
" Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), aq'd, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir.
1989). The Board noted that the striker replacement pro-union presumption had only
been adopted as recently as 1975. Id. at 1342-43 (citing Cutten Supermarket, 220 N.L.R.B.
507 (1975)).
" Id. at 1344 (NLRB expressly overruled Pennco to extent it relied upon pro-union
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though this approach did not preclude the employer from with-
drawing recognition from the union, as did the replacement pro-
union presumption, it severely reduced the means of doing so be-
cause the Board required a showing of good faith doubt of major-
ity support which was virtually unattainable."
III. THE COURT AFFIRMS THE NO-PRESUMPTION POLICY
In analyzing the no-presumption approach, it is submitted that
it is rational to conclude that there are situations where striker
replacements may not oppose the union .7 It is also rational to en-
vision circumstances where the interests of the replacements and
strikers are not "diametrically opposed."' 7 ' If, however, there is a
situation where the interests of the strikers and the replacements
are opposed, the no-presumption approach is rational as it does
not preclude a finding that the replacements reject the union.80
Rather, it places the burden of demonstration entirely on the
employer.81
It is submitted that in order to be consistent with the Act, it is
important for the Board to establish a rational equilibrium be-
presumption).
, See Comment, Determining Liability, supra note 10, at 734. The Board, by removing all
presumptions, charged the employer with the full burden of establishing that it had an
objective basis to have a reasonable doubt that the majority of his employees supported the
union as it had with the pro-union presumption. Id. at 740-41. There remained only a few
ways by which the employer could establish such a claim: violence on the picket line, union
demand for discharge of replacements, employee resignations from the union, decertifica-
tion petitions filed by employees, expressed desires to repudiate the union, union admission
of failing support. Id. at 759. The presence of replacements could contribute to evidence
of union repudiation but only given additional facts and circumstances evidencing repudia-
tion by the replacements. Id. at 759-60.
" NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1550 (1990) (citing Lyng
v. Automobile Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 371 (1988)) (striker replacements who, in fact, sup-
port union and desire representation may oppose strike or be forced to work for economic
reasons).
" Dold Foods, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. No. 156, 129 L.R.R.M. 1174, 1175 (1988) (due to
weak bargaining position union did not request ousting of 169 out of 201 striker replace-
ments); IT Servs., 263 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1982). In IT Sevices, the employer withdrew recog-
nition of the union once it hired 36 replacements for the 31 strikers. Id. at 1185. This
strike situation was permeated by intolerable levels of violence which was particularly racist
in nature. Id. at 1187. However, on the date the employer withdrew recognition from the
union there was enough work for all the strikers to return to their jobs without laying off a
single replacement. Id. at 1185.
" See Flynn, supra note 62, at 710.
01 Id.
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tween the ability of the employer to challenge an incumbent
union and the union's ability to resist that challenge. An employer
has an obligation to negotiate with the representative chosen by
the majority of all of the employees in the bargaining unit, includ-
ing striker replacements.8 However, Board policy must not have
a chilling effect on the employees' right to strike .s In light of the
need to balance these competing interests, it is submitted that the
Supreme Court's decision to uphold the Board's new no-presump-
tion approach was correct.
IV. EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH DOUBT: WHAT IS THE STANDARD?
For an employer to lawfully withdraw recognition from a union,
the Board requires an employer to show either that the union
does not have a majority of support or that the employer has an
objective good faith doubt that the union does not have majority
support." It is submitted that while attempting to strike a balance
between the rights of the union and its members with the obliga-
tions of the employer, it would appear that the effect of the no-
presumption approach is to hold the employer to proof in fact in
order to establish a good faith doubt of majority support. Never-
theless, as articulated by the Board, the no-presumption approach
would allow the employer to use the facts and circumstances of its
own particular bargaining situation to demonstrate an objective
basis for a good faith doubt of majority support for the union. 85
" See Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 32 N.L.R.B. 163, 166 (1941) (replacements are employees
of company entitled to participate in selection of bargaining representative). This ruling
was followed by the adoption of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L.
No. 80-101, Chap. 20, 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 141 et seq (1988)) (both
strikers and replacements are included as employees).
- See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). See also Weiler, supra note 62, at 387-88 ("American labor
law affirmatively promises workers the right to strike . . .")
" See Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1340 (1987).
" Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 128 L.R.R.M. 1326, 1329 (1989)
(relying on ruling in Buckley Broadcasting, will review facts of each case and "require some
further evidence of union non-support"); Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. 1339,
1344 (1987) (Board "will review the facts of each case . . ."), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th
Cir. 1989). See also Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362, 370 (5th Cir.
1988), (Williams, J., dissenting), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1542 (1990). A case by case approach
"allows the Board to take into account the particular circumstances surrounding each
strike and the hiring of replacements, while retaining the long-standing requirement that
the employer must come forward with some objective evidence to substantiate his doubt of
continuing majority status." Id.
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Although the Board had no statutory duty to recognize an em-
ployer's good faith doubt of majority support as a defense to with-
drawal of recognition, the Board has expressed its adherence to
that principle." The employer's good faith defense, as adopted by
the Board over time, was measured by objective evidence of the
reasonableness of an employer's doubt of majority support at the
time it withdrew recognition from the union."7 In Celanese Corp. of
America," the Board stated that the reasonableness of evidence
should be evaluated in light of all of the facts and circumstances in
the particular case and not by application of a formula or any sin-
gle factor.' 9 This is consistent with provisions within the NLRA."
Additionally, rules governing judicial review of agency decisions
require that findings which are unsupported by substantial evi-
dence be set aside." This requirement is also echoed in the
NLRA.91 Nevertheless, as the concurrence in Curtin Matheson
noted, the Board's decision against this employer, as well as other
recent Board decisions, 93 suggests that the critical factor in the
Board's determination of good faith doubt is whether a sufficient
number of employees have "'expressed desires' to repudiate the
incumbent union."'" Board restrictions on polling employees in
" Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1555-56.
See Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 673 (1951) (reasonable grounds for
doubting union majority support prerequisite for good faith defense). See also NLRB v.
Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 299 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979)
("[t]he good faith criterion is unconcerned with the employer's subjective motivation; its
focus is empirical and objective").
- 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
I ld. at 673. "By its very nature, the issue of whether an employer has questioned a
union's majority in good faith cannot be resolved by resort to any simple formula." Id. See
also Tahoe Nugget, 584 F.2d at 305 (evidentiary test for reasonable doubt is cumulative).
29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988). "Any such proceedings shall, so far as practicable, be con-
ducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable to the district courts of the
United States under the rules of civil procedure for the district courts of the United States,
adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States ...." Id.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2XE) (1988).
29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1988). "[T]he findings of the Board with respect to questions of
fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall ... be
conclusive." Id.
" See AMBAC Int'l Ltd., 299 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 135 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1990) (letters
signed by employees indicating preference for "individual, direct negotiations" rather than
union representation warrants withdrawal recognition); Texas Petrochems. Corp., 296
N.L.R.B. No. 136, 132 L.R.R.M. 1279 (1989) (employer must have reasonable doubt of
majority support to conduct poll of employee sentiments).
" See Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1555. See also Tile, Terrazzo & Marble Contractors
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order to determine those sentiments, create somewhat of a di-
lemma.9a The polling necessary to determine whether the union
has a majority of support can itself be conducted only after the
employer has established a good faith doubt of majority support."
If, in Curtin Matheson, the Board did not abandon the good
faith defense, it did abandon its adherence to the Celanese Corp. of
America "totality of the circumstances" standard for establishing
that defense,97 by requiring evidence of actual loss of majority
Ass'n, 287 N.L.R.B. 769, 769 n.2 (1987) (employee's abandonment of strike did not indi-
cate loss of majority support). Citing Buckley Broadcasting, the Board noted that no specific
presumption concerning replacements' union sentiments would be applied and held that
the Respondents failed to provide "sufficient evidence concerning their employees' ex-
pressed desire to repudiate the Union ...." Id. It is submitted that the apparent failure of
the Board to, in fact, consider all the facts and circumstances, in favor of a "head count" of
expressed desires to repudiate the union has created genuine concern in the circuits. See
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 1428, 1433 (10th Cir. 1990). The Tenth
Circuit held that it was an error to rely on express statements made by employees as a
prerequisite to a finding of good faith doubt of majority support. Id. The court reversed
the Board, finding that there was insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of contin-
uing majority support despite proof of harassment of replacements, a petition decertifica-
tion, union resignations, the union's demand for discharge of replacements and the union's
failure to organize replacements. Id.
o See Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063 (1967). The Board adopted the
following criteria for employer prompted polling in order to prevent employers use of pol-
ling to intimidate unions: 1) the purpose of the poll must be to determine the truth of a
union's claim of majority, 2) this purpose must be communicated to the employees, 3) as-
surances against reprisal must be given, 4) the employees must be polled by secret ballot,
and 5) the employer must not engage in unfair labor practices or otherwise create a coer-
cive atmosphere. Id.
Since Strukenes there has been much debate over the standard of doubt which an em-
ployer must meet in order to lawfully poll his employees. The Board's recent requirement
of a "head count" of those who express desire to repudiate the union to support a good-
faith doubt of union majority is made virtually impossible given the requirement of "rea-
sonable doubt" to justify the poll. See Texas Petrochems. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 136,
132 L.R.R.M. 1279, 1285 (1989) (stringent standard for polling promotes bargaining sta-
bility). But see NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 651 F.2d 1141, 1144-45 (5th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting Board's reasonable doubt standard for "loss of support" standard).
" See Texas Petrochems. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 132 L.R.R.M. 1279, 1285
(1989).
" See Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 673 (1951) (whether employer has ques-
tioned union's majority support in good faith determined by totality of circumstances nec-
essarily including reasonable grounds for belief that union had lost its majority status). In
dismissing the complaint against Celanese Corp., the Board held that:
[W]hether the [employer] violated Section 8(aX) ... depends, not on whether there
was sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of the union's continuing majority
status or to demonstrate that the union in fact did not represent the majority of the
employees, but upon whether the employer in good faith believed that the union no
longer represented the majority of the employees.
Id. at 671 (emphasis in original). Cf. Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1445 (1959)
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support." It is suggested, therefore, that the Board muddled its
analysis by failing to identify and distinguish the evidence re-
quired to rebut the presumption of continued majority support
from evidence which establishes a reasonable good faith doubt of
majority status, in defense of a charge of unlawful withdrawal of
recognition from the union. Furthermore, neither the Board nor
the Court noted that even a successful good faith defense may not
necessarily oust a union, as the union would only need a petition
supported by 30% of the bargaining unit employees to gain the
right to another certification election." This petition is equivalent
to the union's burden of proving majority support once the em-
ployer had overcome the presumption of continuing majority sup-
port.10 The failure of the Court to order a review of these incon-
sistencies has created new concerns.
V. POST-CURTIN MATHESON: JOHNS-MANVILLE SALES CORP.
Since the Supreme Court decision in Curtin Matheson, there has
been further judicial review of the Board's no-presumption ap-
proach, Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. NLRB.10' The Johns-Manville
strike was permeated by extraordinary levels of strike related vio-
lence.1 02 After approximately five months of negotiations, the
only issue preventing settlement of the sti'ke was the status of the
(evidence casting serious doubt on union's majority status sufficient to overcome presump-
tion and shift burden of proof to union).
" See Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 350, 353 (1987) ("taking all factors
into account"), enforcement denied, 859 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1542
(1990); Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th
Cir. 1989); Texas Petrochems. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 132 L.R.R.M. 1279 (1989).
' See Comment, Application of the Good-Faith Doubt Test to the Presumption of Continued
Majority Status of Incumbent Unions, 1981 DUKE L.J. 718, 733. "Erroneously deciding the
majority status in favor of the union effectively forces a minority union upon the employ-
ees, whereas dismissal merely requires the union to reprove its majority support." Id. See
also 29 U.S.C. § 159(cX1XAXi) (1988) (authorizing and regulating certification elections).
' See Comment, supra note 99, at 733.
'' 906 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1990).
I ld. at 1430. The violence that took place during the strike consisted of: 1) strikers
blocked the cars of the replacements, shouted at them, made obscene gestures, and called
them "scabs", 2) a dummy with the word "scab" on its chest was hanged by its neck near
the plant entrance, 3) at least 70 cars were damaged, 4) the home of one of the replace-
ments was burglarized, the word "scab" was written on the wall and some furniture was
stolen. Id. Johns-Manville paid employees over $20,000 in compensation for the damages
related to the strike. Id.
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striker replacements.1 03 The union wanted all replacements fired
and Johns-Manville refused.?° Once the replacements were in-
formed of the union's position they immediately gathered enough
signatures to force an election on decertification of the union.? 5
Johns-Manville used the decertification petition and other evi-
dence to support its good faith doubt of majority support and its
subsequent withdrawal of union recognition.1 " Employing the no-
presumption approach, the Board ruled that Johns-Manville did
not have enough evidence of replacement opposition to the in-
cumbent union to support its withdrawal."' The Tenth Circuit,
while supporting the no-presumption approach, reversed the
Board's ruling'" stating that the Board failed to assess the cumu-
lative effect of all the evidence as required by its own standard. 9
The court further asserted that by emphasizing that the employer
must demonstrate the "expressed desires" of a majority of em-
ployees to repudiate the union, the Board limited the devices by
which the employer could make out a good faith doubt of union
support.110 Finally, the court declared that in that circuit, until the
Board formally rejects the good faith doubt standard as a basis for
the withdrawal of recognition, it will require that the Board look
at the "totality of the circumstances" to decide whether good
faith existed."'
VI. SUGGESTED EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS
The primary purpose of the Supreme Court's grant of certio-
rari in Curtin Matheson was to resolve the split among the Circuit
Courts in the application of the striker replacement presump-
a Id.
''Id.
1I ld. On the day the petition was signed the bargaining unit consisted of 290 striker
replacements, 9 returning strikers, 2 workers returning from layoff, and 208 strikers. Id. In
a period of less than a week the striker replacements gathered 211 signatures on a decer-
tification petition. Id. This number was well in excess of the 30% needed to force an elec-
tion. See 29 U.S.C. §159(cXIXA) (1988).
'" John-Manvile, 906 F.2d at 1433.
's, Id.
I d.
I0 d. at 1434.
I d.
... Johns-Manvk 906 F.2d at 1433-34.
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tions. 11 However, the Supreme Court's decision has raised a new
issue: how will the Board and the circuit courts determine "good
faith doubt" under the no-presumption approach? In adopting the
no-presumption policy, it is submitted that the Board attempted to
devise a fair, more logical and effective rule in determining the
relative support for an incumbent union. Nevertheless, the Board
must be consistent in its review of the employer's evidence of
good faith doubt or it should abandon the good faith option."1 It
has been submitted that the loss of majority status by a union
should be inferable by the cumulative weight of several factors:
the presence of permanent replacements; the abandonment of the
union by returning strikers; union admission of failing support;
picket-line violence; statements made by replacements, strikers,
union representatives, and returning strikers which clearly repudi-
ate the union; and union settlement demands that replacements
be discharged so that strikers can return to their jobs.1 ' The exis-
tence of one or more of these factors is usually the only evidence
available to employers to establish good faith doubt of majority
support because the Board makes it "practically impossible to
amass direct evidence of its workers' views. "115 Therefore, the
Board must give them considerable weight when their accumula-
tion indicates a lack of majority support if the "good faith" de-
fense is to mean anything at all.""
CONCLUSION
In Curtin Matheson, the Supreme Court, in light of the level of
review given administrative decisions, and the no-presumption po-
sition's logic and consistency with the NLRA was justified in ap-
proving the Board's decision to abandon all striker replacement
... NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1548-49 (1990).
"I Cf Johns-Manills, 906 F.2d at 1431-32.
114 Id. at 1432. "The Board erred as a matter of law in its reliance in this case, at least
partially, upon a requirement that good-faith doubt must be established by the express
statements of individual workers." Id.
"I See Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116 See Johns-Manvill, 906 F.2d at 1432-33. See also Hajoca Corp. v. NLRB, 872 F.2d
1169, 1175 (3d Cir. 1989) (current standard is one based on "all the circumstances");
NLRB v. Wilder Constr. Co., Inc., 804 F.2d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 1986) (employer must
prove knowledge of facts giving reasonable basis for doubting union's majority).
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presumptions. The Court, however, passed up the opportunity to
instruct the Board to distinguish the evidentiary requirements for
proving an actual loss of majority support and the evidentiary re-
quirements for a reasonable objective basis for a good faith doubt
of the union's majority status. The Court's failure to address this
issue will permit the Board to continue to decide cases based upon
undefined evidentiary criteria, leaving the employer uninformed
as to his obligations and liabilities and burdening the circuit courts
with the task of requiring the Board to clarify its evidentiary re-
quirements. This comment has suggested that the Board clearly
identify the objective circumstantial evidence necessary for the
employer to establish a good faith doubt of majority support for
purposes of withdrawal of recognition, and distinguish that evi-
dence from the evidence necessary to prove an actual loss of con-
tinuing union support by the employees in the bargaining unit.
Once that distinction is properly made and the objective criteria is
established, the no-presumption approach will become useful in
determining majority support for the union. Without such clarifi-
cation, however, the circuit courts will continue to struggle with
the new no-presumption policy and in all likelihood inconsistent
decisions will permeate this area of the law.*
Diane Bruce & Tara Ann Koenig
* As we go to press, Senator Howard Metzenbaum, in light of the recent Eastern Air-
line, Greyhound, and the New York Daily News strikes, has sponsored, with bi-partisan
support, a bill which would amend the NLRA and the RLA to bar employers from hiring
permanent replacements for striking workers.
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